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ARTICLE 
AN ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE AND THE 
DESERT PALACE 
William R. Corbett* 
"[W] hile his eyes are blinking and before he has become 
accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to 
fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images 
or the shadows of images of justice . . . .  "1 
"[T]hese are their hypotheses, which they and every body 
are supposed to know, and therefore they do not deign to 
give any account of them either to themselves or others; but 
they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, 
and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?"2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1550 
II. AN ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE AND THE DESERT (PALACE) ... 1552 
Ill. HISTORY AND HIEROGLYPHICS ........................................... 1554 
IV. BEYOND THE SHADOW OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: 
MOVING TO FIRST PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW .........................................•............... 1562 
* Frank L. Maraist Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center of Louisiana 
State University. I thank Robert M. Weems, career law clerk to District Judge Michael P. 
Mills, Northern District of Mississippi, and Dean Rebecca Hanner White for helpful 
discussions and comments on drafts of this Article. This Article was written with the 
support of a research grant from the LSU Law Center, for which I am grateful. 
1. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, Book VII, at 218 (B. Jowett trans., Oxford Univ. Press 
3d ed. 1888). 
2. Id. Book VI, at 212. 
1549 
1550 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [41 :5 
A. Evidence ...................................................................... 1563 
B. Torts ........... ......... ................... ......... . ........................... 1566 
C. Procedure .............................................•...................... 1569 
v. CONCLUSION ..... .......................................... . ............. . ......... 1577 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this nation's 
landmark employment discrimination law, reached its fortieth 
anniversary in 2004.3 In the midst of anniversary celebrations, 
there is an issue of transcendent importance that demands 
imminent resolution. No issue is more crucial to the litigation of 
intentional discrimination cases than determining what effect 
the U. S. Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. 
Costa' has on the pretext proof structure developed by the Court 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.5 For thirty years, since the 
Court announced it in 1973, the McDonnell Douglas analysis has 
been the colossus of employment discrimination law.6 Is it 
possible that the Court unceremoniously toppled McDonnell 
Douglas in Desert Palace without even bothering to mention the 
case by name? Litigants, lawyers, and judges need an answer to 
that question now. 
Just over a year after the Court decided Desert Palace, the 
Fifth Circuit, in Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc.,7 became the first 
federal court of appeals to address the issue squarely. In an age 
discrimination case, the court concluded that Desert Palace does 
not abrogate McDonnell. Douglas, but instead only requires a 
modification of that proof structure.8 The court explained that the 
new analysis ,  which it called "the modified McDonnell Douglas 
approach," merges the McDonnell Douglas (pretext) and Price 
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e-2000e-15 (2000)). Although enacted in 1964, the effective date of Title VII was 
July 2, 1965. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716, 78 Stat. 241, 266 (1964) (stating that the 
effective date shall be one year after the date of enactment). 
4. 539 u.s. 90 (2003). 
5. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
6. It was dominant for thirty years, and it has been on life support for more than a 
year since Desert Palace was decided. 
7. 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004). 
8. Id. at 307, 312. The case also is notable for its holding that the changes wrought 
in Title VII analysis by Desert Palace also are applicable to the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act. ld. at 311. To the extent that other circuits follow the Fifth Circuit in 
this holding, the interaction of Desert Palace and McDonnell Douglas becomes even more 
important. 
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Waterhouse v. Hopkins9 (mixed-motives) analyses.10 In this 
modified or merged proof structure, the first two stages are good 
old McDonnell Douglas: First, the plaintiff must establish a 
prima facie case, and second, the defendant must "articulate a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the adverse 
employment action.11 Then comes the new part: The court 
explained that at stage three, the plaintiff must produce 
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact12 
either that the defendant's articulated reason was a prete� for 
discrimination (the "pretext alternative") or that the defendant's 
reason is true but another motivating factor for the decision was 
discrimination based on a protected characteristic (the "mixed­
motives alternative").13 'Thus, according to the Fifth Circuit, all 
that Desert Palace requires is a modification of the third stage of 
the McDonnell Douglas analysis. 
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Desert Palace in Rachid 
is an important change in employment discrimination law and 
one that will be helpful to plaintiffs . Still, the Fifth Circuit did 
not go far enough in assessing the implications of Desert Palace. 
McDonnell Douglas, as an important analytical tool with 
procedural ramifications, is dead; that is a message that 
demands a stentorian declaration. This truth leads to the 
conclusion that McDonnell Douglas should be burned on the 
funeral pyre of employment discrimination law. From its 
inception, the pretext proof structure has been an analytical 
framework that has been used by courts at two procedural stages 
of disparate treatment cases (the "assessment of the sufficiency 
of the evidence" stage and the "evaluation of the weight of the 
evidence" stage) to make decisions about whether cases should 
proceed and who should win. McDonnell Douglas, divested of any 
procedural significance after Desert Palace, no longer serves the 
purpose it served during its first thirty-one years. Consequently, 
there is no reason, other than nostalgia, to keep it. The more 
compelling reason to banish it, however, is that because of its 
long history of procedural significance, retaining it will cause 
9. 490 u.s. 228 (1989). 
10. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312. 
11. ld. 
12. It is important to note that the procedural posture of Rachid was an appeal of 
the district court's granting of the defendant's motion for summary judgment. ld. at 308. 
As will be discussed below, the McDonnell Douglas proof structure has been intimately 
tied to procedure, and viewing it in the context of procedure is a key to determining its 
continuing viability in light of Desert Palace. Refer to Part IV. C infra. 
13. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312. 
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confusion in cases and impede recognition of the uniform proof 
structure that necessarily follows from Desert Palace. 
I have been down in the cave before.14 The case law and 
commentaries published in the period since the Desert Palace 
decision have convinced me that it is time to descend once again. 
II. AN ALLEGORY OF THECA VE AND THE DESERT (PALACE) 
It is time to climb out of the cave and look at employment 
discrimination law in the bright light of the sun. Although it was 
understandable that we looked at discrimination cases and saw 
the shadows (the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and the 
mixed-motives analysis) while we were prisoners in the cave, we 
cannot remain so shackled. On a sunny day in June 2003, the 
fetters of some prisoners were taken off, 15 and we ascended out of 
14. William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 199 (2003) (discussing the aftermath of Desert Palace and that 
case's effect on McDonnell Douglas). 
15. With humility, I claim to be one of the freed prisoners. See, e.g., Corbett, May 
You Rest in Peace?, supra note 14 (arguing that Desert Palace has eliminated McDonnell 
Douglas, even though many commentators and practitioners wish not to admit it). I am 
not alone, but the truth I have seen varies somewhat from that seen by my fellow 
pilgrims. The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, a federal district judge, quickly announced 
that Desert Palace had shed light on the shadow of McDonnell Douglas. See Dare v. Wal­
Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (D. Minn. 2003) ("The dichotomy produced by 
the McDonnell Douglas framework is a false one."). Judge Magnuson subsequently 
further explained his view in a concurring opinion in an Eighth Circuit decision, 
concluding that "it is simply impossible to reconcile the ancient McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm with the clear language of the Civil Rights Act." Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 
387 F.3d 733, 747 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson, J., concurring specially). Other judges 
followed. See, e.g., Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers oflowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 
1196 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (noting that although Desert Palace does not "necessarily spell the 
demise of the entire McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm," it does "spell the 
demise of the 'false dichotomy' between the McDonnell Douglas framework . . .  and the 
Price Waterhouse framework"); Griffith v. City of Des Moines, No. 4:01-CV-10537, 2003 
WL 21976027, at *12 (S.D. Iowa July 3, 2003) (agreeing that "plaintiff may bring his Title 
VII claim 'according to the burdens articulated in [the] Civil Rights Act of 1991,' without 
being confined to the strictures of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework" 
(alteration in original)), affd, 387 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2004). While affirming the district 
court's decision, the Eighth Circuit panel rejected the proposition that Desert Palace 
abrogated McDonnell Douglas. Griffith, 387 F.3d at 736 ("[W]e conclude that Desert 
Palace had no impact on prior Eighth Circuit summary judgment decisions."). Other 
commentators also ascended from the cave. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect 
of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 
83, 103 (2004) (positing that in light of Desert Palace's eradication of the distinction 
between mixed-motives cases and pretext cases, "the standardization of disparate 
treatment cases will essentially return disparate treatment jurisprudence to 1972, before 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green was decided"); Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the 
Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 859, 907 (2004) ("McDonnell Douglas should retire and make a graceful retreat into 
history."); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive le Roil": An Essay on the Quiet 
Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert 
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the cave into the Desert and the light of the upper world. Because 
of the brightness of the light and the fact that our eyes were 
accustomed to the dark, it was too painful for us to look at the 
sun, and when we first saw the real object in the harsh light, we 
thought that perhaps the shadows were truer than the real object 
itself. But after growing accustomed to the light of the upper 
world, we saw the shadows as imperfect substitutes for the real 
object ("because of ... race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin").16 Mter marveling at the sight of the real object, we 
enlightened ones must "go down to the general underground 
abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark"17 to teach what we 
have seen in the world above to the other prisoners who remain 
shackled.18 But the prisoners in the cave, who have lived their 
lives watching shadows cast upon a wall, will say that we 
enlightened ones ascended from the cave and returned without 
our eyes.19 
Who could have known that Plato saw the plight of 
employment discrimination lawyers, judges, and scholars so 
clearly in the allegory of the cave! Did the fifth century 
philosopher foresee the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Costa and the subsequent maelstrom? If so, the 
philosopher's prescience rivals that of Nostradamus. Regardless, 
his allegory accurately depicts the state of employment 
Palace Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 71, 72 (2003) 
[hereinafter Van Detta, "Le Roi"J (claiming that "McDonnell Douglas v. Green is dead" 
(footnote omitted)); Jeffery A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort" Redux: Section 703(m), Costa, 
McDonnell Douglas, and the Title VII Revolution-A Reply, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 427, 445 
(2004) (criticizing those who believe that McDonnell Douglas is alive and stating that 
"there is no more room for McDonnell Douglas in the world of Title VII litigation"). 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
17. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 1, Book VII, at 220. 
18. One may ask why I descend into the cave again, having already once gone down 
and proclaimed what I saw in the upper realm. See generally Corbett, May You Rest in 
Peace?, supra note 14. There are several answers. First, I fear that in the first year after 
the Desert Palace decision, the benighted prisoners in the cave are winning in promoting 
their shadows over the real objects. Refer to notes 7-13 supra and accompanying text 
(discussing Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004)). This 
interpretation of the law must be stanched as soon as possible, as this matter is too 
important to allow the proper result to emerge, if at all, over a period of years. Second, to 
free the prisoners, I think the debate should be focused on a few principles that elucidate 
the relationship between the shadows (the proof structures) and the real object 
(employment discrimination). Third, as I understand the command of Socrates in Plato's 
allegory, the freed and enlightened former prisoners must not only descend into the cave, 
but also stay in the cave and continue teaching. Fourth, is not it time for the second 
generation of Desert Palace articles? Fifth, how many times does a law professor limit 
himself to one article on a topic? 
19. See Christopher R. Hedican et al., McDonnell Douglas: Alive and Well, 52 
DRAKE L. REV. 383, 395 (2004) (contending that the holding of Costa is narrow and does 
not overrule McDonnell Douglas). 
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discrimination law in the United States in the twenty-first 
century. 
I apologize to both Plato and those whom I am depicting as 
shackled, benighted prisoners in a cave. I mean no harm. I 
ack.now ledge that I am no sagacious philosopher, and I know that 
those who believe that McDonnell Douglas survived Desert 
Palace are not intellectually inferior to me. The allegory is 
important, however, to show that the proof structures we use to 
analyze employment discrimination are not the thing itself, but 
are like shadows of the ultimate issue, and we have become so 
fixated on them that we are not able to see the thing itself and 
discuss it apart from the proof structures. 
I refuse to be characterized by the cave dwellers as an 
opponent of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. I have loved it 
well,20 I hope that I have defended it with great honort and I 
have almost made·a career of writing about it. I cannot, however, 
ignore the truth that I have seen in the bright light of the Desert 
(Palace) sun, even if the cave dwellers, whom I hope not to 
offend, have not seen it. 22 
III. HISTORY AND HIEROGLYPHICS 
The relevant history can and should be stated succinctly; it 
has been recounted often.23 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was 
passed, obviously, in 1964 and became effective in 1965.24 Title 
VII is the employment section of that landmark civil rights law. 
20. See, e.g. , William R. Corbett, The "Fall" of Summers, the Rise of"Pretext Plus," 
and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to 
Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305 (1996) 
(defending McDonnell Douglas and criticizing the Supreme Court's subsequent 
refinements of the analysis). 
21. Was e'er so eloquent an apology written? See, e.g. , William R. Corbett, Of 
Babies, Bathwater, and Throwing Out Proof Structures: It Is Not Time to Jettison 
McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPL. POL. J. 361 ( 1998) (praising McDonnell 
Douglas for the role it has played in employment discrimination litigation). Though I do 
not consider myself sagacious, one may believe that I love to cite my own work-that is 
three citations so far. Alas, when you have been to the upper realm, you must tell what 
you have seen. 
22. Although I attempt to treat the topic with some levity in this Article, as one 
must do when characterizing people with another view as prisoners in a cave, I wish to be 
clear that the issue is of the utmost importance in employment discrimination law. Every 
day of the week, courts throughout the nation are considering motions for summary 
judgment and jury instructions and necessarily grappling with the effect that Desert 
Palace has on the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis. This is not merely an interesting 
debate about theory. Litigants' rights are at stake, and the issue needs to be resolved with 
all deliberate speed. 
23. For some of the most recent recitations, refer to notes 15, 19 supra. 
24. Refer to note 3 supra. 
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Title VII is generally understood as declaring it unlawful to 
discriminate in employment decisions and actions "because of 
[an] individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."25 In 
1973, in the second Title VII case to reach the U.S. Supreme 
Court26-McDonnell Douglas-the Court recognized how difficult 
it is for plaintiffs to present evidence of discrimination ''because 
of [their] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 
Accordingly, the Court created a proof structure (or analysis or 
framework, if you prefer) to be used in evaluating intentional 
discrimination cases.27 Justice O'Connor would later explain that 
the shadow was created to aid plaintiffs, who seldom have the 
benefit of direct evidence, in the presentation of their evidence of 
discrimination. 28 
The McDonnell Douglas, or pretext analysis, is a three-part 
framework. The first step under this framework requires the 
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of intentional 
discrimination.29 To meet the prima facie case, a plaintiff must 
prove (1)  the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) the 
plaintiff applied for and was qualified for the job at issue; 
(3) despite the plaintiffs application and qualification, the 
plaintiff was rejected; and ( 4) the position remained open and the 
defendant-employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 
the same qualifications as the plaintiff.30 Once the plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case, a presumption is created that the 
defendant-employer unlawfully discriminated against the 
plaintiff.31 At this point, the burden of production shifts to the 
defendant to rebut the presumption of intentional discrimination 
by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for rejecting the plaintiff or preferring someone else. 32 Once the 
defendant-employer satisfies this burden of production, the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's 
reasons are merely a pretext for discrimination. 33 The meaning 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
26. In the first Title VII case to reach the Court, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424 (1971), the Court recognized the disparate impact theory of employment 
discrimination. 
27. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) ("The critical issue 
before us concerns the order and allocation of proof in a[n] . . . action challenging 
employment discrimination."). 
28. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
29. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
30. Id. 
31. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-54 (1981). 
32. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
33. Id. at 804. 
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and procedural effect of the second and third stages were 
developed in subsequent Court decisions: Texas Department of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine,34 St. Mary's Honor Center v. 
Hicks,35 and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, lnc.36 The 
elements of the prima facie case have been adjusted to address 
different types of cases, such as various adverse employment 
actions (McDonnell Douglas involved a refusal to rehire) and 
"reverse discrimination" cases.37 
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis in employment discrimination law. 
Although developed in a Title VII case, it has been applied to 
intentional discrimination claims under almost all of the federal38 
and state employment discrimination laws.39 It has been adopted 
(sometimes with modifications) for retaliation claims40 and 
employment law claims other than employment discrimination.41 
The Court developed an alternative proof structure for 
intentional discrimination cases . in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins. 42 The plurality's framework is commonly referred to as 
the "mixed-motives analysis" because it permits a finding that 
the adverse employment decision was taken for both lawful and 
34. 450 U.S. 248, 260 (1981) (holding that when the plaintiff in a Title VII case "has 
proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant bears only the burden of 
explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions"). 
35. 509 U.S. 502, 509-11 (1993) (declaring that proof of pretext at the third stage of 
McDonnell Douglas does not require a judgment in favor of the plaintiff). 
36. 530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000) (holding, with regard to the third stage of 
McDonnell Douglas, that a prima facie. case and sufficient evidence of pretext usually will 
support a finding by the trier of fact of unlawful discrimination without additional, 
independent evidence of discrimination, though such a showing may not always be 
adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability). 
37. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 & n.6 
(1976). 
38. See, e.g., West v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 330 F.3d 379, 384-85 (5th Cir. 
2003) (applying pretext analysis in an ADEA case); Patten v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc., 
300 F.3d 21, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying mixed-motives analysis to an ADA case), cert. 
denied, 539 U.S. 937 (2003). 
39. See, e.g., Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1113-14 (Cal. 2000) (adopting 
McDonnell Douglas's three-stage burden-shifting test in a case decided under California 
law). 
40. See, e.g., Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 577 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a trial court must give a pretext jury instruction for a retaliation claim 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act). 
41. See, e.g., Grey Wolf Drilling Co. v. Perez, No. 04-02-00802-CV, 2004 WL 383328, 
at *1-*2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 3, 2004, no pet. h.) (applying pretext analysis to a 
claim of retaliatory discharge under the state workers' compensation law). 
42. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The Price Waterhouse proof structure was borrowed from 
constitutional law analysis in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. u. Doyle, 429 U.S. 
274 (1977). Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 248-49 (plurality opinion). 
2005] THE CAVE AND THE DESERT PALACE 1557 
unlawful reasons.43 The first step of this· analysis required the 
plaintiff to show that a protected characteristic was a 
motivating factor in the employment decision.44 Justice 
O'Connor's concurring opinion stated the measure of causation 
as higher than a motivating factor: Causation should be 
measured by determining whether a protected characteristic 
was a substantial factor in the employment decision.45 Once the 
plaintiff met her burden, the burden then shifted to the 
defendant-employer to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that it would have taken the same action for 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.46 This affirmative 
defense, often called the "same-decision defense," permitted the 
defendant to escape liability. 47 
In the aftermath of Price Waterhouse, courts were left to 
glean from the several opinions a standard of causation to use in 
the mixed-motives analysis. The plurality opinion adopted a 
"motivating factor" standard, but it did not have the support of a 
majority of the Court. Justice O'Connor's "substantial factor test" 
was the standard used by most courts after the Price Waterhouse 
decision. A second issue courts had to resolve after Price 
Waterhouse was the criterion to distinguish between when the 
McDonnell Douglas pretext or the Price Waterhouse mixed­
motives analysis applied to a particular case. Courts again 
turned to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion and seized upon 
the distinction she made: Cases involving direct evidence were 
analyzed under mixed motives, and cases involving 
circumstantial evidence were analyzed under the pretext 
framework. 48 
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress set abo11t to rectify 
several employment discrimination decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and Price Waterhouse was among them.49 The 
Price Waterhouse modification and codification produced a 
motivating factor standard of causation and a same-decision 
limitation of remedies in which the burden of persuasion is on 
the defendant. 5° Under the statutory version of that analysis, a 
plaintiff proves discrimination if she proves that the protected 
43. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45 (plurality opinion). 
44. Id. at 257 (plurality opinion). 
45. Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
46. !d. at 252-53 (plurality opinion). 
47. Id. at 258 (plurality opinion). 
48. Id. at 270-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
49. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 45-49 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
549, 583-87. 
50. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991). 
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characteristic was a motivating factor in the employer's 
decision.51 At that stage, the employer is liable for a violation of 
the employment discrimination statute, but the employer has the 
· opportunity to establish a partial affirmative defense: If the 
employer proves that it would have taken the same action absent 
the impermissible motivating factor, then the remedies are 
limited to some types of injunctive relief, declaratory relief, 
attorneys' fees (which are discretionary), and costs.62 This same­
decision limitation of remedies had been a complete affirmative 
defense under the Price Waterhouse version. 53 
After the emergence of the mixed-motives proof structure in 
1989, the law of intentional discrimination was divided between 
McDonnell Douglas pretext and Price Waterhouse-Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 mixed motives. McDonnell Douglas was 
predominant, 64 as courts determined that most cases involved 
"only" circumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence. 55 One 
court adroitly depicted the difficulty courts faced in classifying 
cases: "[A]lthough the results of the analyses are significantly 
different, the analytic difference between these two types of cases 
is razor-thin, which has made the area a particularly difficult one 
for the courts . . . .  "56 Given the difficulties posed by classifying 
and analyzing cases and the important rights at stake, the two­
proof-structure state of the law was criticized, 57 with McDonnell 
Douglas bearing the brunt of the criticism. 68 Some commentators 
51.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). 
52. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) . 
53. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242 (plurality opinion). 
· 54. See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REv. 226, 
408-09 & n.66 (2003). 
55. See, e.g. , Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 350-51 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(applying the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework because it was specifically 
developed to deal with cases involving "only'' circumstantial evidence of discrimination); 
MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1441 (lOth Cir. 1996) (applying the 
McDonnell Douglas analytical framework because the plaintiff failed to produce direct 
evidence of discrimination). 
56. Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1995). 
57. See, e.g. , Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive 
Bias Approach to Discr:imination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 
1161, 1219 (1995). 
I d. 
[N]either the Price Waterhouse Court, nor the district and circuit courts which 
applied it, have been able to devise workable standards for delineating the 
respective spheres of the pretext and mixed-motives variants of disparate 
treatment proof. Indeed, under the current majority approach to this problem, 
neither the parties, the court, nor the jurors are apt to know which of the two 
competing variants will apply to determine liability until, at the earliest, the 
conclusion of the plaintiffs case. 
58. See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After 
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advocated a uniform analysis for intentional discrimination 
cases.69 
By 2003 the stage had long been set for Desert Palace, in 
which McDonnell Douglas met the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The 
Ninth Circuit rendered an en bane decision in Desert Palace, 
holding that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, there was no 
basis for requiring direct evidence to invoke the motivating factor 
standard of section 703(m).60 Accordingly, the court held that 
Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2259 (1995) (commenting on burden of proof problems 
under McDonnell Douglas that were created after the Hicks decision); see also Judith 
Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment 
Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY 
L.J. 1487, 1527 n.l82 (1997) (agreeing with Malamud that it would be best to abandon 
McDonnell Douglas). See generally Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty 
and Error in the New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1996) 
(discussing "whether the Hicks Court's interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas test 
increases the fairness and accuracy of the Title VII system"); Kenneth R. Davis, The 
Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 
61 BROOK. L. REV. 703 (1995) (calling for the abandonment of McDonnell Douglas because 
its pretext rules are unsatisfactory, its claimed benefits are "largely illusory," and it is 
superfluous in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991); George Rutherglen, Reconsidering 
Burdens of Proof: Ideology, Evidence and Intent in Individual Claims of Employment 
Discrimination, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL 'y & L. 43 (1993) (criticizing McDonnell Douglas because 
its proof structure is ineffective in resolving motions for summary judgment and its 
constitutional law ideology complicates the practical problems in employment 
discrimination law); Stephen W. Smith, Title VII's National Anthem: Is There a Prima 
Facie Case for the Prima Facie Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371 (1997) (arguing for replacement of 
the McDonnell Douglas minuet with "a Restatement-like set of proof requirements" 
because "the McDonnell Douglas framework contributes about as much to the proper 
outcome of a discrimination case as the Star Spangled Banner contributes to the proper 
outcome of a baseball game"). 
59. Professor Michael Zimmer was the principal proponent of the uniform analysis. 
See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence: Individual Disparate Treatment 
Discrimination and the ADEA, 51 MERCER L. REV. 693, 713 (2000) (arguing for a uniform 
approach that would allow the plaintiff to establish the defendant's liability by proving 
the defendant's employment decision was motivated by a protected characteristic and, if 
so proven, under which the defendant could affirmatively defend that it would have made 
the same decision despite the characteristic); Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform 
Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 625 
(1996) [hereinafter Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure] (recommending that all 
disparate treatment cases should be analyzed under the uniform structure established by 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991); see also Benjamin C. Mizer, Note, Toward a Motivating 
Factor Test for Individual Disparate Treatment Claims, 100 MICH. L. REv. 234, 262 (2001) 
(suggesting that the courts should perform a textual analysis of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 in deciding employment discrimination claims and offering some practical issues 
that attorneys will face in these cases). But see Robert A. Kearney, The High Price of Price 
Waterhouse: Dealing with Direct Evidence of Discrimination, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
303, 330-32 (2003) (dividing cases by "affirmative" and "negative" evidence of 
discrimination and preserving McDonnell Douglas analysis for cases involving negative 
evidence). 
60. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 853-54 (9th Cir. 2002) (en bane), 
affd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). Section 703 is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and has 
subsequently been modified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
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direct evidence of discrimination is not required for a court to 
give the mixed·motives jury instruction. 51 The Ninth Circuit also 
explained that McDonnell Douglas remains a viable analysis at 
the summary judgment stage, but is not relevant to jury 
instructions.62 Regarding jury instructions, the Ninth Circuit 
opined that a court, in evaluating the evidence, can give one of 
two instructions: (1) if the court evaluates the evidence as 
supporting a finding either that a discriminatory reason was the 
sole reason or not a reason at all, the court should instruct the 
jury to decide whether the employment action was taken 
''because of' the illegal reason, or (2) if the court evaluates the 
evidence as supporting a finding that a discriminatory reason 
was among two or more reasons for the employment action, the 
court should instruct the jury regarding the motivating factor 
standard and the same-decision partial defense. 53 
Surprisingly (at least to me), the Supreme Court affirmed 
the Ninth Circuit in a unanimous "short and direct opinion',s4 
that held that "in order to obtain an instruction under 
§ 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for 
a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice."'65 With that, the 
Court dispensed with the circumstantial-direct evidence line of 
demarcation between McDonnell Douglas pretext cases on the 
one hand and mixed-motives cases on the other. The Court 
reiterated the point in a footnote: "[I]n light of our conclusion 
that direct evidence is not required under§ 2000e-2(m), we need 
not address . . .  the appropriate standards for lower courts to 
follow in making a direct evidence determination in 'mixed 
motive' cases under Title VII[.]"66 So what did the Court say 
about McDonnell Douglas? Nothing expressly. In fact, the Court 
clarified what it would not say; in a footnote,- the Court stated, 
61. Id. at 856-59. 
62. ld. at 856. 
63. Id. at 856-57. 
64. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 54, at 404. The 
same commentators also described the opinion as "short in length and modest in tone." Id. 
at 410. Although brevity, directness, and modesty are usually virtues to be extolled in 
court opinions, I would have preferred more length and flamboyance if that was necessary 
to produce discussion in the Court's Desert Palace opinion of the vital signs of McDonnell 
Douglas. 
65. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(m) (2000)). 
66. Id. at 101 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2005] THE CAVE AND THE DE SERT PALACE 1561 
"This case does not require us to decide when, if ever, 
§ 107 applies outside of the mixed-motive context."67 
For over a year now, lawyers, courts, and commentators 
have been grappling with the issue of what effect Desert Palace 
has on McDonnell Douglas and thus on the litigation of 
intentional discrimination cases under perhaps all federal 
employment discrimination statutes.68 The court decisions can be 
divided into the following groups:  (1)  those taking note of the 
issue but determining that they do not have to decide it,69 often 
because they find that the same result would be reached under 
either analysis, 70 (2) those holding that McDonnell Douglas 
survives Desert Palace,71 and (3) those holding that Desert Palace 
67. Id. at 94 n.l. 
68. AB previously mentioned, the pretext and mixed-motives analyses have been 
applied to intentional discrimination cases under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Refer to note 38 supra and 
accompanying text. Because the Desert Palace decision is based on the language of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII and the ADA, but not the ADEA, it can 
be argued that Desert Palace is not applicable to the ADEA. See Rachid v. Jack In The 
Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 310-12 & n.8 (5th Cir. 2004). The Fifth Circuit, however, decided 
to apply whatever changes were made by Desert Palace to the ADEA.id. at 312 (holding 
that "the mixed-motives analysis used in Title VII cases post-Desert Palace is equally 
applicable in ADEA''). Other circuits may disagree. See, e.g., Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 
330, 340 (4th Cir. 2004) ("We have not had occasion to decide whether the mixed-motive 
provision under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applies to the ADEA. We have previously 
expressed doubt that it does, and instead we have suggested that the Price Waterhouse 
framework still applies to ADEA claims."); see also Snik v. Verizon Wireless, No. Civ.A.03-
CV-2976, 2004 WL 1490354, at *2 (E.D. Pa . . July 1, 2004) (noting a possible conflict 
between the Fifth Circuit in Rachid and the Fourth Circuit m Mereish). 
69. See, e.g., Riggs v. Kan. City Mo. Pub. Sch. Dist., 385 F.3d 1164, 1167 (8th Cir. 
2004) (observing that the court need not decide whether Desert Palace altered McDonnell 
Douglas); Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 2004) (deciding, as a 
different panel of the Fifth Circuit than that which decided Rachid, that the McDonnell 
Douglas issue did not require determination because the plaintiffs claims "fail[ed] under 
any interpretation of Desert Palace"); Allen v. City of Pocahontas, 340 F.3d 551, 557-58 
n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Desert Palace but declining to decide its effect on the McDonnell 
Douglas issue because the petitioner "provided no evidence, direct or circumstantial, from 
which a reasonable jury could logically infer that age or gender was a motivating factor in 
her termination"), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1182 (2004). 
70. See, e.g., Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that the plaintiffs case should have survived summary judgment under either 
the mixed-motives or pretext analysis); Louis v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 303 F. 
Supp. 2d 799, 803 (M.D. La. 2003) (determining that the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment "should be denied under both the McDonnell Douglas framework and the 
mixed-motives analysis"). 
71. See, e.g., Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the 
argument that Desert Palace overruled McDonnell Douglas); Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312 
(declaring that the mixed-motives analysis survived Desert Palace through a merging of 
the McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse decisions); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 
360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004) (construing Desert Palace as providing the plaintiff at 
the summary judgment stage with the choice of whether to invoke McDonnell Douglas's 
presumption or simply "produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a 
1562 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [41:5 
struck down McDonnell Douglas.72 If one were keeping score, I 
fear that the shadows to which we have grown accustomed are 
keeping us enthralled. 
Surely the Court did not intend to abolish thirty years of 
employment discrimination case law without saying so. Fittingly, 
in an area of the law in which debate about motivation, 
causation, and intent flourishes, what the Court meant or 
intended may not matter. From what the Court said, it 
necessarily follows that McDonnell Douglas is gone. One can only 
see this, however, by climbing out of the cozy cave. 
IV. BEYOND THE SHADOW OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: 
MOVING TO FIRST PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 
The pretext analysis is an attempt to depict the fact of 
employment discrimination through the shadows of evidence, 
torts, and procedure. The first principle, among first principles, 
that must be accepted to begin the journey out of the cave is that 
the pretext analysis is not the real object. Achieving acceptance 
of this principle is no small task. Thirty years of focusing on this 
shadow has persuaded us that Title VII and the other 
employment discrimination laws are all about the proof 
discriminatory reason" motivated the employment decision); Carey v. Fed.Ex Ground 
Package Sys., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 902, 914-17 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (analyzing the various 
ways that courts have applied McDonnell Douglas since the Desert Palace holding and 
concluding that the correct approach is a modified McDonnell Douglas framework); 
Herawi v. Ala. Dep't of Forensic Sci., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1345 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (stating 
that "there is nothing in Desert Palace to undermine the usefulness of McDonnell 
Douglas"); Higgins v. Hosp. Cent. Servs. Inc., No. CIV.A.04-CV-00074, 2004 WL 2850079, 
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2004) ("McDonnell Douglas is still valid precedent."); Rozskowiak v. 
Vill. of Arlington Heights, No. 01 C 5414, 2004 WL 816432, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2004) 
(concluding, after a review of Desert Palace, that "McDonnell Douglas remains a viable 
framework for evaluating summary judgment motions"); Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. 
Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1197-98 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (holding that, in 
light of Desert Palace, McDonnell Douglas only needs modification at the final stage of the 
burden-shifting paradigm). 
72. See, e.g. , Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990 (D. Minn. 
2003) (interpreting Desert Palace as an affirmation that Congress intended to abrogate 
the McDonnell Douglas analysis with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991); Griffith 
v. City of Des Moines, No. 4:01-CV-10537, 2003 WL 21976027, at *12 (S.D. Iowa July 3, 
2003) (agreeing with the holding in Dare), affd, 387 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2004). Although 
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court in Griffith, it rejected the proposition that 
Desert Palace abrogated McDonnell Douglas. See Griffith, 387 F.3d at 735. Judge 
Magnuson, the district judge who authored the Dare decision, sat by designation on the 
Eighth Circuit panel that heard Griffith and specially concurred to express his 
disagreement regarding the continuing viability of McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 739, 745 
(Magnuson, J., concurring specially). 
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structures. 73 Admitting that the shadow is not reality will not be 
easy.74 
Title VII and the other employment discrimination laws 
prohibit adverse employment actions ''because of' race, color, sex, 
disability, et cetera. What does this mean? How are courts to 
evaluate whether a particular adverse employment action was 
taken because of a protected characteristic? The statutes do not 
say-they do not define discrimination in a useful way-and this 
is not an easy matter.75 That is why we have looked at the 
shadows since 1973. It will hurt our eyes to look at employment 
discrimination law in the bright light of Desert Palace. 
A. Evidence 
Evidence principles have helped us see the shadows and 
imagine what employment discrimination looks like. The courts 
have told us that there can be either direct or circumstantial 
evidence of "because of' discrimination. The proof structure 
developed in McDonnell Douglas is nothing more than a set of 
rules regarding presentation and evaluation of circumstantial 
evidence. In that respect, it is like the tort "doctrine" of res ipsa 
loquitur. Under res ipsa, if a plaintiff is able to establish certain 
predicate facts, then that circumstantial evidence may have a 
procedural effect on the case-such as creating a rebuttable 
presumption of negligence or permitting an inference of 
negligence.76 Courts have cautioned, however, that res ipsa 
loquitur, although treated as mystical, is nothing more than a set 
of principles regarding the use of circumstantial evidence. 77 The 
73. See, e.g., Van Detta, "Le Roi," supra note 15, at 84 ("McDonnell Douglas and 
Burdine became such an ingrained part of employment discrimination law that few 
remember what it was like without them or that they were not actually enacted as part of 
Title VII." (footnote omitted)); cf. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, supra 
note 54, at 409 ("[D]ependence on the McDonnell Douglas framework most likely reflects 
unreasoned ossification of jurisprudence rather than informed confidence in its 
application."). 
74. See THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 1, Book VII, at 218; see also Corbett, 
supra note 14, at 219 (predicting that judges and lawyers would "cling tenaciously to 
McDonnell Douglas"); Van Detta, "Le Roi ," supra note 15, at 138 ("[I]t will take several 
years to adjust to the new interpretation of section 703(m)."). 
75. See, e.g. , Martha Chamallas, Title VII's Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive 
Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 307-09 (2004) (stating that the statutes do not define 
"discrimination," that "Title VII law has never been easy," and that "after more than a 
decade of litigation under the revised [1991] Act, . . .  Title VII law has never been more 
complex and confusing"); see also Davis, supra note 15, at 859 (describing employment 
discrimination law as "befuddl[ing] most of those who have attempted to master it"). 
76. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 154, at 370-89 (2000) (outlining the 
elements of res ipsa loquitur). 
77. See, e.g. , Cangelosi v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg'l Med. Ctr., 564 So. 2d 654, 660 
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real issue 1n a negligence analysis is whether the defendant 
breached the standard of care. The same warning about not 
mistaking the principles of circumstantial evidence for the real 
issue is equally applicable to the McDonnell Douglas pretext 
proof structure. 
Before Desert Palace, the type of evidence proffered provided 
the line of demarcation between intentional discrimination cases 
that were evaluated under the pretext proof structure and those 
that were evaluated under the mixed-motives analysis. That 
divider was never a good one because there is no bright line 
between what is direct evidence and what is circumstantial 
evidence.78 In Desert Palace, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the 
varying approaches among the circuits for distinguishing direct 
from circumstantial evidence and, thus, how to choose a proof 
structure.79 The court described this case law as "a quag}nire," a 
"morass," and "chaos."80 The U.S. Supreme Court erased the 
chimerical dividing line in Desert Palace, holding that direct 
evidence is not required for a plaintiff -to obtain a motivating 
factor jury instruction.81 But the Court did not say, and in fact 
declined to say, whether the motivating factor standard applies 
to all intentional discrimination cases.82 
We have been here before. After Price Waterhouse, the Court 
left the lower courts to work out how to apply its analysis to 
intentional discrimination cases. Interestingly, the several 
opinions in Price Waterhouse, with no majority on major issues, 
left the lower courts with plenty of discussion with which to 
work. Desert Palace, in contrast, leaves the lower courts with a 
unanimous opinion but little discussion with which to work. The 
Court's reticence notwithstanding, one conclusion necessarily 
follows from the Court's Desert Palace holding-McDonnell 
Douglas is dead. 
Some courts83 and commentators84 insist that the two proof 
structures remain. For example, one commentary states, "In 
spite of the Court's silence, . . .  it is clear that a meaningful 
(La. 1990). 
78. See, e.g. , Kearney, supra note 59, at 304 (noting the lack of consensus among 
federal courts in defining what evidence is "direct"). 
79. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 851-53 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 539 
u.s. 90 (2003). 
80. Id. at 851-53. 
81. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 & n. 3 (2003). 
82. Id. ("[W]e need not address . . .  'the appropriate standards for lower courts to 
follow in . . .  "mixed motive" cases . . . [.]'"). 
83. Refer to note 71 supra and accompanying text. 
84. Refer to note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
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distinction between mixed-motive and pretext cases still exists 
under Title VII after Costa."85 Such insistence avails little without 
suggesting what new standard determines which cases are 
analyzed under each proof structure. Courts and commentators 
· have suggested that the remaining distinction is that there are 
cases in which there is only a single motive for an adverse 
employment action and cases in which there are multiple 
motives.86 This distinction, however, will not suffice. It assumes 
that single-motive and multiple-motives cases exist and that 
litigants, lawyers, or courts can distinguish one from the other. 
Under the case law that developed under Price Waterhouse, we 
first looked to the type of evidence and then on that basis we 
classified a case as single or mixed motive. The number-of­
motives distinction was predicated on the type of evidence; it was 
an evidence-based shadow, and apart from that shadow it has no 
independent reality.87 Even if the distinction were founded on 
reality, how are courts to know which cases are single motive and 
which are mixed? 
Professor Chambers has deftly demonstrated that the types 
of evidence presented in pretext and mixed-motives cases do not 
differ and thus that "one cannot support providing a motivating­
factor instruction in a mixed-motives case and refusing to provide 
one in a pretext case."88 Still, he questions what quantity and 
quality of evidence "will trigger a motivating-factor instruction in 
either case"89 and offers three possibilities.90 Although Professor 
85. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 54, at 405. 
86. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 309 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(positing that a different analysis applies to cases in which there is a single motive versus 
cases in which there are mixed motives); The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, 
supra note 549, at 407-08 (distinguishing the "ultimate substantive issue of causation" in 
pretext and mixed-motives cases). 
87. Judge Magnuson explained in Dare u. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 267 F. Supp. 2d 
987 (D. Minn. 2003), 
The dichotomy produced by the McDonnell Douglas framework is a false 
one. In practice, few employment decisions are made solely on [the] basis of one 
rationale to the exclusion of all others. Instead, most employment decisions are 
the result of the interaction of various factors, legitimate and at times 
illegitimate, objective and subjective, rational and irrational. 
Id. at 991; see also Krieger, supra note 57, at 1223 (''Mixed-motives theory reflects much 
more accurately than pretext theory the processes by which cognitive sources of bias 
result in intergroup discrimination . . . .  Thus, in a very real sense, every case of 
discrimination resulting from cognitive bias is a 'mixed-motives' case."). 
88. Chambers, supra note 15, at 99. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 101-02. The three possible amounts of evidence sufficient to trigger a 
motivating-factor instruction would be (1) substantially less, (2) the same as that 
currently required to reach a jury in a pretext case, or (3) the same as that required in 
any standard disparate treatment case. Id. 
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Chambers has cast light on most of the shadows, and although he 
recognizes the correct answer, 91 he also recognizes that courts 
may not be willing to overturn thirty years of employment 
discrimination doctrine without a clear direction from the 
Court.92 Further, he states that the Court is unlikely to provide 
further guidance. 93 Then, by explaining the options that courts 
may pursue, Professor Chambers chooses to become descriptive 
rather than prescriptive.94 In so doing, he does not insist upon the 
necessary ramification of Desert Palace. He is probably correct 
about what courts will do to accommodate McDonnell Douglas to 
Desert Palace, and the preponderance of court decisions to date 
confirm the accuracy of that prediction. My objective, however, is 
different: I want to let the full light into the cave and dispel the 
shadow of McDonnell Douglas's continuing viability once and 
for all. 
B. Torts 
Professor Van Detta has argued that employment 
discrimination claims are tort claims.95 Indeed, Justice O'Connor 
in Price Waterhouse prefaced a discussion of standards of 
causation for employment discrimination by referring to "the 
statutory employment 'tort' created by Title VII."96 The tort 
characterization of employment discrimination claims is a big 
subject,97 but I wish to examine only a small part of it. The 
''because of' language has been interpreted as requiring proof of 
causation.98 Employment discrimination law arguably took a bad 
turn with this analogy to tort law because tort concepts of 
causation do not capture the way in which discrimination 
occurs. 99 Indeed, Professor Krieger has offered a cogent argument 
91. Id. at 100 ("If the argument is persuasive, a motivating-factor jury instruction 
would be appropriate in all standard, pretext, and mixed-motives cases."). 
92. Id. at 101. 
93. Id. at 102-03. 
94. Id. at 101-02. 
95. Van Detta, "Le Roi," supra note 15, at 81-83. 
96. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
97. See, e.g., Cheryl Krause Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense 
to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of 
Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 193-97 (1993) (decrying the privatization 
(tortification) of Title VII). 
98. Professor Van Detta decries the focus on intent and insists that the statutory 
language signals causation. Van Detta, "Le Roi," supra note 15, at 92-100. Although this 
may be a distinction worth pursuing, the pretext and mixed-motives proof structures have 
been understood as evaluating causation. 
99. Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed 
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that the pretext and mixed-motives proof structures, focusing as 
they do on causation, fail to capture the cognitive process by 
which discrimination occurs.100 With all of the U.S. Supreme 
Court opinions on causation and Congress's adoption of the 
motivating factor standard in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, that is 
not my fight here. The several opinions in Price Waterhouse make 
clear that the proof structures have been based on an 
interpretation of the standard of causation required by the 
"because of' language of the statutes. The plurality said that "the 
specification of the standard of causation under Title VII is a 
decision about the kind of conduct that violates that statute."101 
The plurality rejected the idea that "because of' necessarily 
means but-for causation, adopting instead a motivating factor 
standard of causation.102 The dissent criticized the plurality's 
interpretation of "because of' as not meaning "but for" and 
pointed out that by creating the affirmative defense, the plurality 
had in fact retained a but-for causation standard.103 Concurring, 
Justice O'Connor joined the fray over the appropriate causation 
standard and expressly recognized the tort law roots of the but­
for causation standard.104 Surveying the causation standards 
discussed in tort law, Justice O'Connor agreed with the dissent 
that "because of' means but-for causation, but borrowing from 
tort law, she expressed the standard as a "substantial factor" 
standard.105 Then, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress 
agreed with the Price Waterhouse plurality and defined the 
standard of causation as a motivating factor standard: "[A] n 
unlawful employment practice is established when the 
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice."106 
It is often stated that the McDonnell Douglas pretext 
analysis adopted a but-for standard of causation.107 Indeed, I have 
Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REv. 17, 92 (1991) ("All 
attempts to apply causal theories derived from tort law to human actions are doomed to 
failure . . . .  "). 
100. Krieger, supra note 57, at 1164-65. 
101. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237 (plurality opinion). 
102. ld. at 241 (plurality opinion) . . 
103. ld. at 282-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
104. Id. at 263-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
105. Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). 
107. See Chambers, supra note 15, at 99-100 ("The Supreme Court's pretext 
jurisprudence requires that a plaintiff prove but-for causation."); Malamud, supra note 58, 
at 2259 (noting that "but-for" is "the standard of proof generally required under 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine"); Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 59, at 
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said that.108 I want to confess that I now have reservations about 
characterizing the pretext analysis as incorporating but-for 
causation. It may be more accurate to characterize the pretext 
analysis, at least as it is stated (though perhaps not as it is 
applied), as incorporating sole-factor causation.109 The principal 
problem with characterizing the pretext analysis in causation 
terms is perhaps that we are discussing "apples and oranges"­
we long have mixed causation, motivation, and intention when 
we talk about "because of' discrimination.110 As Professor Belton 
has explained, there is a "potential conceptual difference between 
'but for' and 'pretext' analysis."111 That is, when a factfinder 
concludes at stage three of the McDonnell Douglas analysis that 
the employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual, 
it concludes that the discriminatory reason is the sole basis for 
the adverse employment action. 112 Still, the Court in Price 
Waterhouse insisted on causation standards for ''because of' 
discrimination, 113 and Congress appears to have followed the 
Court in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 .114 Although it may 
be mixing causes, motives, and intents to compare the standards 
of causation in the pretext and mixed-motives proof structures, 
the Court did it in Price Waterhouse, and I think it is important 
to do so here to understand why Desert Palace killed off 
McDonnell Douglas. McDonnell Douglas's standard of causation 
607 (referring to the "'but for' test routinely applied in McDonnell Douglas I Burdine 
cases"); cf. Kearney, supra note 59, at 310 (contrasting the motivating factor causation 
standard with McDonnell Douglas, and characterizing McDonnell Douglas as a 
"determining" or "but for" factor test). 
108. Corbett, supra note 14, at 212. 
109. See, e.g., Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 472 (3d Cir. 1993) <"mt is clear 
that in pretext cases the claim is that the discriminatory motive was the sole cause of the 
employment action . . . .  "), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 865 (1993). Professor Davis argues that 
the pretext analysis included only a motivating factor causation standard. Davis, supra 
note 15, at 895-98. I think he is the only commentator to advocate this proposition, and I 
think he is incorrect. It may be that the pretext analysis cannot be properly interpreted in 
causation standards, but the important point is that, as all have heretofore agreed, the 
pretext analysis imposes a more rigorous burden on plaintiffs than !foes the motivating 
factor standard. The objective of a majority of the Court in Price Waterhouse was to 
develop a proof structure more favorable than McDonnell Douglas for plaintiffs who could 
present direct evidence. Congress further eased the burden by codifying the motivating 
factor standard in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
110. Gudel, supra note 99, at 92 (reasoning that causal theories from tort law are 
"doomed to failure" and that the question of racial discrimination cannot be resolved by 
looking at motive or intent). 
111. Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment 
Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. 
REV. 1359, 1383 (1990). 
112. See id. at 1384. 
113. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
114. See 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). 
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(or whatever the analysis is measuring) is higher or more 
rigorous (harder for a plaintiff to satisfy) than section 703(m)'s 
motivating factor standard. After Desert Palace, a plaintiff 
cannot be required to satisfy the higher standard of the pretext 
analysis. 
C. Procedure 
Fimilly, the most significant shadows in which we have seen 
employment discrimination are those of procedure.115 The story of 
the. development of intentional discrimination law is the story of 
U.S. Supreme Court cases discussing the procedural significance 
of evidence presented via the proof structures: McDonnell 
Douglas, Burdine, Price Waterhouse, Hicks, Reeves, and Desert 
Palace. There are two procedural stages at which the proof 
structures can be invoked to analyze a case: decisions as to 
whether a party (usually the plaintiff) has produced sufficient 
evidence to get the case to the factfinder (motions for summary 
judgment and judgment as a matter of law) and decisions as to 
whether the party with the burden of persuasion has satisfied 
that burden. Discussing the proof structures in the abstract­
that is, not in the procedural contexts in which they are 
relevant-is a mistake that sometimes keeps one in the cave 
looking at the shadows. For example, when the Court interpreted 
the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis in St. Mary's 
Honor Center v. Hicks,116 the interpretation was characterized as 
a devastating loss for plaintiffs that had killed the ·pretext-only 
interpretation of the analysis.117 Hicks, however, held only that a 
plaintiff does not necessarily satisfy the burden of persuasion 
and win a case by proving pretext. 118 Most of the battles over the 
import of proving pretext (the battle of pretext-plus versus 
pretext-only119) arose in the context of whether a plaintiff satisfies 
115. See, e.g., Van Detta, «Le Roi," supra note 15, at 105 ("'Procedure now defines 
\mlawful discrimination and determines the outcome of Title VII cases'-and it has been 
largely that way since 1973." (footnote omitted) (quoting Phyllis Trapper Baumann et al., 
Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Interpretation of Substantive and Procedural 
Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REv. 211, 220 (1992))). 
116. 509 u.s. 502, 510-11 ( 1993). 
117. See, e.g. , Malamud, supra note 58, at 2234--36; see also Davis, supra note 15, at 
869 (declaring that Hicks "remold[ed] the framework into ineffectuality" and "thwarted 
the original purpose of the framework"). Professor Davis wrote his assessment after 
Reeves, and I find it surprising that he views Hicks as eviscerating McDonnell Douglas in 
light of Reeves. He views Reeves very differently than I, however, characterizing it as 
further damaging McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 869-70. I view Reeves as reaffirming the 
relevance of the pretext analysis to the burden of production (sufficiency of the evidence). 
118. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 505-07. 
1 19. See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: 
1570 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [41:5 
the burden of producing sufficient evidence by proving pretext.120 
The Court demonstrated this when it addressed the issue of the 
effect of proving pretext on the burden of production in Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.121 
The first procedural principle that will assist in the ascent 
out of the cave is to consider the proof structures in the context of 
procedure and, more specifically, in the context of the burden of 
production and the burden of persuasion. The Ninth Circuit 
believed this and explained its abrogation of the direct evidence 
requirement in Desert Palace by discussing it in a procedural 
context.122 Although I believe the court made some mistakes, I 
think it was correct to evaluate the ongoing relevance of the proof 
structures in terms of their procedural ramifications. 
The second principle regarding procedure is that if a proof 
structure has no procedural effect, it should be discarded. 
Commentators who called for the abandonment of McDonnell 
Douglas after Hicks grasped this point,123 although they failed to 
see the continuing relevance and importance of the pretext 
analysis to the burden of production (sufficiency of the evidence). 
Because the post-Desert Palace pretext analysis has no 
procedural effect on evaluating either (1) the satisfaction of the 
burden of production (sufficiency of the evidence) on motions for 
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law or (2) the 
satisfaction of the burden of persuasion in the court's jury 
instructions, the proof structure has no practical use and should 
be abandoned. 
I will address the post-Desert Palace irrelevance of 
McDonnell Douglas to the burden of persuasion first, because the 
conclusion I reach has implications for the burden of production 
as well. The Ninth Circuit explained that the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis is not relevant to jury instructions (which entail burden 
of persuasion) but is instead relevant to the summary judgment 
evaluation (which entails burden of production). 124 Having 
The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HAsTINGS 
L.J. 57 (1991) (outlining the competing rules governing proof at the pretext stage). 
120. See Corbett, supra note 21, at 38 1-83 (discussing the impact of the Hicks 
decision on the McDonnell Douglas analysis and the "pretext-plus/pretext only" debate). 
121 .  530 u.s. 133, 142-43 (2000). 
122. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 851 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 539 U.S. 90 
(2003). 
123. See, e.g. , Malamud, supra note 58, at 2236-37 (calling for abandonment of the 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof structure because it "does nothing the normal rules of 
civil procedure cannot do"). 
124. Costa, 299 F.3d at 856 ("This determination is distinct from the question of 
whether to invoke the McDonnell Douglas presumption, which occurs at a separate, 
earlier stage of proceedings [and) involves summary judgment rather than jury 
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explained that the pretext analysis is irrelevant to jury 
instructions, the Ninth Circuit curiously (and incorrectly) 
explained that two jury instructions are viable. First, if the court 
evaluates the evidence and finds that it could support a finding of 
multiple motives, then the court should instruct the jury on 
motivating factor and the same-decision defense.125 If, on the 
other hand, the court deems the evidence to support only one 
cause for the adverse employment action, either a discriminatory 
or nondiscriminatory reason, then the court should instruct the 
jury to determine whether the action was "because of' the 
discriminatory reason, and there is no same-decision defense.126 
This "because of' jury instruction resurrects pretext despite the 
court's insistence that McDonnell Douglas, or pretext, is not 
relevant to jury instructions. 
Using the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Desert Palace, one can 
perceive that once the dividing line between pretext and mixed­
motives cases is erased, McDonnell Douglas cannot have any 
effect on jury instructions and the resolution of whether the 
burden of persuasion is satisfied. I realize, of course, that the 
Ninth Circuit did not view its "because of' instruction as related 
to pretext, but in fact, it is . The court explained the basis for 
giving the instruction: "If, based on the evidence, the trial court 
determines that the only reasonable conclusion a jury could reach 
is that discriminatory animus is the sole cause for the challenged 
employment action or that discrimination played no role at all in 
the employer's decisionmaking . . . .  "127 That is exactly what 
pretext analysis does-select one reason as the cause of the 
action. Even before Desert Palace, many courts had said that 
pretext jury instructions were not to be given.128 Mter Desert 
Palace, such a jury instruction is nonsensical. 129 Plaintiffs have 
instructions . . . .  "); id. at 857 ("McDonnell Douglas and 'mixed-motive' are not two 
opposing types of cases. Rather, they are separate inquiries that occur at separate stages 
of the litigation."); see also McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 
2004) (stating that a plaintiff responding to a motion for summary judgment may choose 
how to present her case-either pursuant to McDonnell Douglas or by simply presenting 
direct or circumstantial evidence that discrimination motivated the defendant). 
125. Costa, 299 F.3d at 856-57. 
126. ld. at 856. 
127. Id. 
128. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1241 (lOth Cir. 
2002) (discussing the split but holding that under some circumstances it is reversible 
error to refuse to give a requested pretext instruction). 
129. Professor Davis disagrees, arguing that ''the Supreme Court intended the 
McDonnell Douglas framework to apply not only at the summary judgment stage but also 
at trial." Davis, supra note 15, at 903. I do not understand how one can argue for a 
uniform mixed-motives analysis with a motivating factor standard of causation, as Davis 
does, and yet maintain that "a court will frequently have to provide the jury with 
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always wanted the mixed-motives analysis with the lower 
standard of causation and the shift in the burden of persuasion 
on the same-decision defense. With no dividing line between 
types of cases, there is no basis for a court to hold a plaintiff to 
any standard of causation other than, or higher than, the 
statutory motivating factor standard. One would have to believe 
that there is some new divider other than direct evidence­
circumstantial evidence for distinguishing cases. As discussed 
above, no such standard is known.130 One may argue, however, 
that regardless of the pretext and mixed-motives proof 
structures, a ''because of' instruction must be permissible 
because it uses the statutory language of Title VII. In light of 
Desert Palace, however, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be 
understood as clarifying the standard of causation indicated by 
the 1964 phrase ''because of."131 Thus, after Desert Palace, a jury 
instruction containing the motivating factor standard and the 
same-decision partial affirmative defense encompasses all that is 
needed and all that is correct in disparate treatment cases. 
Suppose plaintiffs begin requesting "because of' or pretext 
jury instructions in order to avoid the second jury instruction in a 
mixed-motives analysis-the second instruction being the same­
decision defense. Look at the shadows, and if you strain, you 
might see a plaintiff argue to the judge that her evidence of 
discrimination is so strong and the defendant's evidence so weak 
that she is entitled to a pretext or a "because of' jury instruction, 
which would deprive the defendant of the same-decision 
instruction that limits remedies if the defendant satisfies the 
burden of persuasion. In my last journey back into the cave, I 
described the foregoing argument as "fanciful."132 Now I wish to 
say more: it is wrong. First, it is not the province of either party 
to decide what is the standard of causation applicable to the case; 
that is the court's job.133 If one accepts my argument in the 
preceding paragraph, that after Desert Palace the standard of 
causation for all intentional discrimination cases is the 
motivating factor standard, then the idea that a plaintiff could 
alternative instructions." Id. at 904. Of course, Professor Davis and I disagree about the 
standards of causation, and that at least in part explains our difference on jury 
instructions. 
130. Refer to Part IV.A supra. 
131. Davis, supra note 15, at 904 ("One of the purposes of Price Waterhouse and 
§ 2000e-2(m) was to explain what 'because of means."). 
132. Corbett, supra note 14, at 214. 
133. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12 (1989) ("At some point in 
the proceedings, of course, the District Court must decide whether a particular case 
involves mixed motives."). 
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request a jury instruction on a higher standard should not even 
be entertained. Second, even if courts permitted litigants to 
select their standards of causation, a residual "because of' 
instruction does not make sense procedurally. If a plaintiff were 
to gamble and argue for a jury instruction that imposes a higher 
standard of causation, the court should decline · and instruct on 
the motivating factor standard. The mixed-motives analysis 
involves, when the same-decision defense is taken into account, a 
but-for standard of causation. The dissent in Price Waterhouse 
demonstrated that point.134 Thus, the plaintiff's argument must 
be viewed as improvidently asking to be permitted to bear the 
burden of persuasion on at least but-for causation (or perhaps 
sole causation). 
Yet suppose a plaintiff really wants such a ''because of' or 
pretext jury instruction to ensure that all remedies are awarded 
(differently stated, to ensure that there is no possibility of a jury 
deciding the same-decision defense in favor of the defendant). 
Surely the law must account for situations in which the plaintiff 
has an overpowering case and those in which the defendant's 
case is so weak that he is not entitled to raise the same-decision 
defense. Furthermore, what about cases in which both sides 
present evidence of reasons, but only one reason or the other can 
be believed? The same-decision defense should not limit remedies 
in either of those types of cases. The mixed-motives proof 
structure, viewed in a procedural context, provides for both of 
those types of cases and should produce a full recovery for the 
plaintiff. 
In the first type of case, if a plaintiff has such a strong case 
and a defendant has such a weak case (meaning insufficient 
evidence supporting its asserted reason for the adverse action), 
then the court should grant a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law in favor of the plaintiff.135 The court should reach this result 
by finding that the plaintiff proved an impermissible motivating 
factor and that the defendant's evidence is so lacking on the 
same-decision defense that the jury could not reasonably decide 
in defendant's favor on that point. 
Turning from cases that are ripe for decision on judgment as 
a matter of law, imagine the second type of case in which 
134. Id. at 285 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that the same-decision defense 
invokes but-for causation). 
135. Courts have the authority to grant such motions sua sponte. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
50(a)(1); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Leahey, 219 F.3d 519, 546 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining 
that it is "'clearly within the [district] court's power"' to enter judgment as a matter oflaw 
"on its own initiative" (quoting Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 135, 139 
(6th Cir. 1995))). 
1574 HO USTON LAW REVIEW [41:5 
sufficient evidence supports both the plaintiffs alleged 
discriminatory reason and the defendant's alleged legitimate 
reason. A court may evaluate the evidence in such a case as 
supporting a result in which only one reason can be credited, 
because the reasons advanced by the plaintiff and the defendant 
are mutually exclusive, but that decision is a credibility call for 
the jury to make.136 Although a court should not dispose of such a 
case by judgment as a matter of law, the jury can resolve it under 
a mixed-motives jury instruction and award full remedies by 
rejecting the defendant's same-decision defense. Although a 
plaintiff may prefer to avoid the same-decision defense jury 
instruction (and the prospect that the jury may reach the wrong 
result under it), such avoidance is not appropriate when 
sufficient evidence supports the employer's asserted reason.137 
Thus, plaintiffs need not and should not resort to asking for 
pretext jury instructions to obtain full relief, and in any event, 
courts should not give such instructions. The procedural device of 
judgment as a matter of law and the mixed-motives jury 
instructions account for and produce appropriate results in cases 
in which plaintiffs should be awarded all remedies. 
The notion that the pretext analysis should be retained to 
benefit plaintiffs on jury instructions is an incredible proposition. 
The pretext analysis was developed for cases of "weaker" 
circumstantial evidence. Has it now become the source of a jury 
instruction that is to be the "secret weapon" sought by plaintiffs 
with evidence so overwh�lming that they should be able to avoid 
the same-decision defense? It takes a greater leap to read Desert 
Palace as turning employment discrimination law on its head in 
that way than it does to read Desert Palace as abrogating 
McDonnell Douglas. 
Thus, pretext analysis, which many courts and 
commentators thought had no relevance to jury instructions and 
burden of persuasion before Desert Palace, is now certainly 
irrelevant. Perhaps, however, the pretext framework retains 
procedural relevance regarding the burden of production 
136. I am indebted to Dean Rebecca Hanner White for pointing out the need to 
address such cases. 
137. The National Labor Relations Board has recognized that a mixed-motives 
analysis is adequate to address all types of discrimination cases, applying its Wright Line 
analysis to cases alleging discrimination under section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor 
Relations Act. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083 (1980) (setting forth the 
analysis), enforced, 662 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); see also 
Taylor & Gaskin, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 563, 563 n.2 ( 1985) (stating that Wright Line applies 
to both pretext and mixed-motives cases); Kelly Robert Dahl, Note, Price Waterhouse, 
Wright Line, and Proving a Mixed Motive Case Under Title VII, 69 NEB. L. REV. 869, 895 
(1990) (same). 
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(sufficiency of the evidence). That is what the Ninth Circuit said 
in its Costa opinion, 138 and that is the context in which the Fifth 
Circuit found continuing viability in Rachid.139 
Burden of production (sufficiency of the evidence) long has 
been the procedural stronghold of McDonnell Douglas. Mter the 
"fall" of McDonnell Douglas in Hicks, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the relevance of the proof structure on the issue of 
sufficiency of the evidence in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, Inc. 140 Although I argued after Hicks that McDonnell 
Douglas still was procedurally relevant, 141 I see that it is 
irrelevant after Desert Palace. Consider the usual situation in 
which a defendant moving for summary judgment or judgment as 
a matter of law argues that under McDonnell Douglas the 
plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of either the 
elements of the prima facie case or pretext--the two stages at 
which the plaintiff bears the burden of production.142 Because the 
pretext analysis entails a higher (more rigorous) standard of 
causation than the motivating factor standard, and because there 
is no basis on which to divide the cases between the proof 
structures, a plaintiff cannot be required to meet the pretext 
standard on such a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. If 
I am correct in my argument that pretext is irrelevant to the 
burden of persuasion, it surely follows that the standard of 
causation invoked by a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence must mirror the standard of causation invoked for the 
burden of persuasion. That is, it would be erroneous to apply the 
motivating factor standard for the burden of persuasion but 
require pretext proof for the burden of production. 
Even if pretext remains relevant to the burden of 
persuasion, it does not follow that pretext analysis should 
be used for the burden of production. The Court's plurality in 
Price Waterhouse said that cases do not have to be labeled as 
pretext or mixed-motives from the beginning.143 Because there is 
no requirement that a case be classified at the summary 
judgment stage, a plaintiff should be able to defeat a motion for 
138. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 539 U.S. 90 
(2003). Refer also to note 124 supra. 
139. Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004). 
140. 530 u.s. 133, 142-43 (2000). 
141. See Corbett, supra note 21, at 391 (stating that McDonnell Douglas "gives 
procedural significance to both the employer's articulation of a reason and the employer's 
success or failure in responding to a plain tift's proof of pretext"). 
142. See Van Detta, "Le Roi," supra note 15, at 105-08 (detailing defendants' use of 
McDonnell Douglas on summary judgment motions). 
143. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
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summary judgment by producing sufficient evidence that the 
discriminatory reason was a motivating factor. 
If McDonnell Douglas is irrelevant to burdens of persuasion 
and production, one could still argue that a plaintiff may present 
evidence pursuant to the pretext proof structure. This essentially 
was the position of the Fifth Circuit in Rachid v. Jack In The 
Box, Inc.144 Christopher Hedican, Jason Hedican, and Mark 
Hudson, arguing for the continuing viability of McDonnell 
Douglas, contend that a plaintiff can continue to prove 
discrimination under McDonnell Douglas and that if a plaintiff 
can thereby "make a submissible case . . .  , then he or she is 
entitled to the mixed-motive instruction."145 Indeed, it is true 
that, even bereft of procedural effect, the pretext analysis could 
be used by lawyers and courts to analyze the case and organize 
the evidence. The problem with this seemingly innocuous 
approach (''We've had it so long, can't we just keep it around and 
play with it?") is that McDonnell Douglas has not been just a 
playful pet. It has had procedural significance for a very long 
time, and it is easy to become confused and believe that it still 
does. Given its past, a merely "useful" McDonnell Douglas 
analysis will cause more problems than it is worth.146 Moreover, 
evidence is not presented in cases pursuant to McDonnell 
Douglas, anyway. As Justice Scalia admonished the dissent in 
Hicks, defendants do not come forward at some point during a 
trial and say, "'Your honor, pursuant to McDonnell Douglas the 
defendant hereby formally asserts [its legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason] ."'147 Plaintiffs can present pretext 
evidence and any other evidence they have, and employers can 
present evidence of their legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons 
just fine without McDonnell Douglas. Nothing is gained by 
keeping it, except the prospect that it will be reinvested with 
some of its procedural significance. Indeed, it is not clear in 
either the Rachid opinion or the Hedican flow chart148 whether 
the pretext approach is without procedural effect. 
Stripped of procedural significance and having no place in 
the organization and presentation of evidence at trial, what is 
left for McDonnell Douglas? It is a mere shadow of its former self, 
144. 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004). 
145. Hedican et al., supra note 19, at 399. 
146. See Davis, supra note 15, at 888-89 (arguing that the only usefulness of 
McDonnell Douglas now is forcing a defendant to articulate a reason for its action, and 
that is not reason enough to keep it). 
147. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 522-23 (1993). 
148. Hedican et al., supra note 19, at 426. 
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and one that will confuse and distract us and generally work 
mischief if it is permitted to linger. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This is my second descent into the cave. I liked the shadow 
that was McDonnell Douglas. I have been above, however, and I 
have seen employment discrimination law in the light of the U.S. 
Supreme Court's Desert Palace decision. Like it or not, we must 
abandon the shadow and learn to see in the bright Desert 
(Palace) light. In 1995, after the Supreme Court decided Hicks, 
Professor Deborah Malamud wrote that "the time has come to 
put false appearances aside and to reorient the discourse on 
disparate treatment cases accordingly."149 Although I thought her 
call for abandonment was premature at the time, it is apt now. 
149. Malamud, supra note 58, at 2311. 
